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PATENT LAW IN THE AGE OF THE
INVISIBLE SUPREME COURT
Mark D. Janis*
In this article, University of Iowa Law Professor Mark Janis ex-
amines "the permanence of the [Supreme] Court's retreat to the pe-
ripheries of patent law after the creation of the Federal Circuit," ex-
ploring what roles the Supreme Court might imagine for itself in
contemporary patent law. Professor Janis first establishes some pa-
rameters for Supreme Court decision making in patent cases by ana-
lyzing two extremes: an aggressive interventionist model and an ex-
treme noninterventionist model. He then proposes an intermediate,
managerial model in which the Court's role centers on an effective al-
location of power among institutions of the patent system. The
managerial model encourages the Court to impose prudential restric-
tions on the scope of its own patent opinions and rejects the paradigm
of ad hoc, substantive error correction as a serious future role for the
Court in patent law.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has rendered itself well nigh invisible in mod-
ern substantive patent law. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit, created in 1982, has become the de facto supreme court of patents.
In those rare patent cases when the real Supreme Court has materialized,
the Court has left behind a largely uninspiring jurisprudence When
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
Thanks to several Iowa colleagues for helpful commentary and to the participants at the University
of Illinois symposium. Particular thanks to Professors Jay Kesan and Thomas S. Ulen, the organizers of
the symposium. I am also indebted to Professor John Duffy for his insights on the Supreme Court and
its potential to serve as a more important institutional player in the patent system. Bob Holub and Paul
Bennett provided excellent research assistance. Any errors are my own.
1. See Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 130 (1999); Pfaff v. Wells
Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997);
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508
U.S. 83 (1993); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986).
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winnowed down to those cases dealing directly with substantive patent
issues, the jurisprudence is paltry indeed
It is not entirely surprising that the Supreme Court maintains such a
low profile in patent cases. Besides traditional judicial disenchantment
with patent cases,3 factors such as the Court's historical trend away from
a court of general error correction, the current structure of the federal
judiciary, and simple practical considerations such as caseload pressures,
point away from robust Supreme Court involvement in patent law.4
In other respects, however, the Court's benchwarmer status in the
patent system seems a bit antique -a bit twentieth century, as it were.
Intellectual property is now widely regarded as pivotal in the twenty-first
century economy, a fact which surely cannot have escaped the Court's
collective notice. Certainly, too, the Court's interest has recently been
piqued by intellectual property issues as complex as the parameters of
product configuration trade dress.' So, Federal Circuit notwithstanding,
why should we assume that the Court is inevitably destined to be a bit
player in the patent system?
This article comments on the permanence of the Court's retreat to
the peripheries of patent law after the creation of the Federal Circuit.6 It
2. Only Pfaff, 525 U.S. 55 (on-sale bar), Wamer-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17 (doctrine of equivalents),
and Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. 661 (FDA exemption from infringement) actually raise and resolve substantive pat-
ent issues.
3. Justice Fortas, for example, once wrote that:
The patent system is strange and weird territory to most judges. They have never seen anything
that resembles it. All patents look more or less strange and threatening to them; and since they
are heavily armed with the power of the U.S. government, they frequently get the idea that it's
their duty to kill everything that moves in this dangerous land.
Abe Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 810, 810 (1971). In a similar vein, Justice
Frankfurter took the view that "The layman knows little and cares less about patent controversies....
Here is nothing to ignite the popular imagination." FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIs, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 175 (1927) (explaining why early legislation favoring creation of a pat-
ent court did not become a mainstream political issue). The wry observations of Judge Graham, then the
presiding judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, are especially representative:
While these patent and trademark cases are of vast importance to the industrial life of the coun-
try, I can think of a number of things about which both layman and judge could become more
wildly excited. Tabloid reporters do not haunt our confines, and newspaper photographers do
not snap-shot us as we wait. The questions presented are technical . .. [s]ome of them cry to the
very heavens in their aridity.
William J. Graham, The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Its History, Functions and Jurisdiction, FED.
BAR ASS'N J., Oct. 1932, at 33,37.
4. See infra Part II.
5. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (holding that product-design
trade dress cannot be inherently distinctive); see also Court Will Consider Whether Trade Dress Protection
Is Available for Patented Designs, 60 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 182 (2000) (reporting certiorari
grant in TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2715 (2000) to consider whether federal
trade dress protection extends to a product configuration covered by an expired utility patent). To be sure,
these controversies are the product of considerable ferment in the regional appellate tribunals, a feature
that is absent from modem patent law given the existence of the Federal Circuit.
6. Few patent scholars have probed this terrain. For apparently the only systematic study of the
Supreme Court's role in Federal Circuit-era patent law, see Mark J. Abate & Edmund J. Fish, Supreme
Court Review of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 1982-1992, 2 FED. CIR. B.J. 307
(1992) (offering relevant statistics and brief conclusions as to Supreme Court decision-making trends in
patent cases); see also Donald S. Chisum, The Supreme Court and Patent Law: Does Shallow Reasoning
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invites deliberation on the roles that the Court might imagine and con-
struct for itself as one of the important institutions of the patent system. 7
It begins by drawing some brief conclusions about the Court's past role.'
Then, for purposes of framing the discussion concretely, the article pro-
ceeds to envision, and then evaluate, three models for Supreme Court
decision making in patent cases, concluding that a process-oriented
model is worthy of further investigation. Conceivably, the conclusions
reached here may also be instructive more generally on the dynamics of
generalist judicial review of the work product of specialized tribunals.'
II. STRUCTURAL AND NONSTRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS: LESSONS
FROM Two CENTURIES OF SUPREME COURT PATENT JURISPRUDENCE
An historical analysis of roughly two centuries of American patent
jurisprudence yields little evidence of any coherent modus operandi for
Supreme Court decision making in patent cases. Instead, two pragmatic
observations emerge about Supreme Court oversight of patent law: first,
in large part, the Court's role has been an artifact of structural arrange-
ments in the federal judiciary existing at any given time; and, second, to a
smaller extent, the Court's role has evolved from the predilections of a
few notable justices who have taken a special interest in patent law.
A. Structural Considerations
Structural arrangements in the early federal judiciary dictated, or at
least facilitated, substantial Supreme Court involvement in patent law.
Similarly, structural reorganization over the past two centuries has con-
ferred on the Court increasingly greater discretion to move to the mar-
gins of patent law.
In the early decades of the republic, Supreme Court justices might
frequently encounter patent cases, either at circuit court-where indi-
vidual justices sat in fulfillment of their duty to ride circuit 1° - or as a col-
Lead to Thin Law?, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (1999) (reproducing transcript of Chisum's speech
on Supreme Court's performance in patent decisions since 1950).
7. In articulating a role for the Supreme Court in patent matters, the present article necessarily
builds on and extends important work on the role of the Federal Circuit, offering, it might be said, a top-
down perspective on the Federal Circuit. The leading work on the Federal Circuit as an institution is Ro-
chelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(1989).
8. See infra Part II.
9. The Federal Circuit is sometimes identified as a model for other experiments in specialized adju-
dication. E.g., Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for a Specialized Copyright Court:
Eliminating the Jurisdictional Advantage, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENr. L.J. 717,774-84 (1999) (offering the
Federal Circuit as a model for a proposed new specialized copyright court).
10. See 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3503 (2d ed. 1984)
(explaining that "the circuit courts were to hold two sessions each year at each district within the circuit,
with the circuit court made up of two justices of the Supreme Court and of the district judge for the dis-
trict"). Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, circuit courts had no permanently assigned judges. Panels were
comprised of Supreme Court justices assigned to ride circuit, along with district court judges. See id Cir-
No. 1]
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lective body at the Supreme Court itself, where the justices were obliged
to take appeals as of right from circuit court decisions."
Perhaps the justices learned something useful from this compulsory
exposure to the front lines of patent warfare. In any event, the quaint
picture of a distinguished Supreme Court justice riding into town to pre-
side over a mundane patent trial was destined to give way before the re-
alities of the post-Civil War industrialized economy. The same was true
of nondiscretionary Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court docket reportedly became so backlogged that patent litigants
might experience delays of up to ten years between appeal and Supreme
Court decision,12 a serious problem in view of the limited duration of the
patent grant.
Two proposals relevant to the Supreme Court's role in patent cases
began to emerge in the late nineteenth century: first, proposals to organ-
ize appellate circuit tribunals along the lines of the modern Courts of
Appeals; 3 and second, proposals for the creation of a specialized patents
court.1" The former overwhelmed the latter; Congress recognized the
Circuit Courts via the Evarts Act of 1891,15 but tabled proposals for a
patent court, for nearly a century as it turned out. Significantly, the
Evarts Act also provided that judgments in circuit court cases in some
areas, among them patent law, would be "final," subject only to discre-
tionary review by certiorari to the Supreme Court. 6 The implementation
of certiorari jurisdiction in patent cases, and others, represented a major
cuit court jurisdiction was not limited to appellate jurisdiction. Indeed, circuit courts acted as courts of first
instance in a number of early patent cases. This meant that Supreme Court justices might preside over pat-
ent trials. For a famous example, see Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (Story, J., sitting
as circuit justice in a jury trial). For a brief account of the jurisdictional arrangements in patent cases prior
to 1819, see EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN
PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, at 357-58 (1998).
11. As early as 1819, the patent statute expressly provided for direct appeal of patent cases from the
circuit courts (then operating as courts of first instance in patent cases). See Patent Act of Feb. 15, 1819, 3
Stat. 481 (providing that the circuit courts would have "original cognisance" of any case "arising under" the
patent laws, and specifying that "from all judgments and decrees of any circuit courts... a writ of error or
appeal, as the case may require, shall lie to the Supreme Court of the United States"). Similar language
appears in the Patent Act of 1836, a more important ancestor of modem patent law. See Patent Act of July
4, 1836, ch. 357, § 17, 5 Stat. 117. Prior to the express statutory recognition of an appeal right, patent cases,
like other civil cases, could be appealed as of right from the circuit court to the Supreme Court if the
amount in controversy exceeded $2,000. See WRIGHTETAL, supra note 10, § 3503.
12. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., SINGLE COURT OF APPEALS -A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1 (Comm. Print
1959) [hereinafter SINGLE COURT].
13. See WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 10, § 4002; see also Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for
a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIs. L. REv. 11, 18-21 (discussing jurisdictional arrange-
ments under the 1789 act and reviewing subsequent reforms).
14. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 176-77 (reporting that the first bills proposing a
patents court were introduced in 1878).
15. See Act of Mar. 3,1891, ch. 517,26 Stat 826.
16. See id at 828 (Evarts Act § 6); see also WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 10, § 4002 n.12 (referring to
Evarts Act § 6). Subsequently, Congress extended the Court's discretionary jurisdiction substantially be-
yond the discrete areas called out in Evarts Act § 6. See Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. 9H 1251-1294 (1976)).
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turning point, initiating a departure from the Court's traditional role as
general error-correcting court towards a role as elite lawgiver. 7
For .patent cases, the result was predictable: the Court's involve-
ment in routine patent matters ceased. Indeed, some perceived the
Court's involvement in patent infringement cases as so limited that the
nine circuit courts effectively were functioning as "nine different courts
of last resort."' 8 Concerning appeals from patent office administrative
decisions, 9 the Court's role was literally nonexistent: the Court ques-
tioned whether its certiorari jurisdiction over the relevant tribunal, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), extended to patent deci-
sions at all, on the grounds that it was unclear whether such CCPA deci-
sions were decisions of an Article III tribunal." In any event, whether a
matter of jurisdiction or Supreme Court reluctance to involve itself in
such cases, the Supreme Court denied every certiorari petition from pat-
ent cases in the CCPA until 1966 when it finally confirmed that the pat-
ent decisions of the CCPA were judicial determinations of an Article III
tribunal, and hence, subject to the Court's certiorari jurisdiction. 1
17. Chief Justice Taft was perhaps the most preeminent proponent of the limitations of certiorari
jurisdiction and the transformation of the Court away from the error-correcting model. E.g., Jurisdiction of
Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Cour Hearing Before the Comm on the Judiciary,
67th Cong. 2 (1922) (statement of Hon. William Howard Taft, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States) (characterizing the Supreme Court's function as "passing upon constitutional questions and
other important questions of law" and "preserv[ing] uniformity of decision among the intermediate courts
of appeal"), cited in Eugene Gressman, Much Ado About Certiorari, 52 GEo. L.J. 742, 755 (1964); see also
Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261 U.S. 387, 393 (1923) (Taft, C.J.). The Chief Jus-
tice stated:
[Ilt is very important that we be consistent in not granting the writ of certiorari except in cases in-
volving principles the settlement of which is of importance to the public as distinguished from the
parties, and in cases where there is a real and embarrassing conflict of opinion and authority be-
tween the circuit courts of appeal.
Id. For the distinction between error-correcting and lawmaking functions of appellate tribunals, see Arthur
D. Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court's Exercise of Discretionary Review, 44
U. PITT. L. REv. 795 (1983). Error correction may be characterized as review of factual determinations,
procedure, or the application of law .to facts, but not the announcement of law, which is presumed to be
clear. The lawmaking appellate function does encompass the harmonization or clarification of legal rules,
potentially including the resolution of conflicts among inferior tribunals. See id. at 795-96; see also William
H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1, 11 ("The his-
tory of the Supreme Court has been a gradual evolution from an error-correcting court of general appellate
jurisdiction to a court whose special concerns are constitutional interpretation and significant questions of
federal law.").
18. SINGLE COURT, supra note 12, at 1.
19. See Postum Cereal Co. v. Cal. Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 (1927). Such decisions would have in-
cluded refusals to grant patents, priority determinations in interferences, and refusals to grant reissues.
20. See id at 699-701. The question of Supreme Court jurisdiction was still viewed as unsettled even
after the enactment of an express statute purporting to confer certiorari jurisdiction to the Court in all of
the CCPA's "cases." See 28 U.S.C. § 1256 (1952) ("Cases in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari."). Specifically, some argued that a CCPA patent
determination was not a judicial determination, and hence not a "case" within the meaning of § 1256. See
generally J.P. McDonnell, Certiorari to and the Constitutional Status of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 704 (1963) (reviewing a variety of arguments and concluding that the
CCPA was an Article III court properly within the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction).
21. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519,527 (1966).
No. 11
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The dominant structural consideration influencing the Supreme
Court's modern role in patent law is, of course, the interposition of the
Federal Circuit into the federal judiciary. In general, a lack of uniform
application of law across circuits and consequent opportunities for forum
shopping fueled yet more proposals for a patents court.22 Once again,
proposals for a patents court became intertwined with proposals for am-
bitious reforms of the appellate system generally. 23 However, in a rever-
sal of the late nineteenth century debate, the general reform proposals
failed and the proposals for a patents court eventually took hold, result-
ing in the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Oc-
tober, 1982.24 Congress conferred an array of jurisdictional responsibili-
ties on the Federal Circuit in addition to its patent jurisdiction. 5 As for
patents, the Federal Circuit assumed the CCPA's patent jurisdiction, and
assumed jurisdiction over appeals from all district court cases "arising
under" the patent laws.26
By designating the Federal Circuit a court of appeals, Congress also
ensured that decisions of the Federal Circuit were reviewable at the Su-
preme Court by grant of certiorari.2 7  Anecdotal evidence suggests that
proponents of the Federal Circuit legislation understood Supreme Court
review to be important, at least symbolically. Professor Meador, for ex-
ample, remembered later that it was "politically unacceptable to shut off
any case in the lower federal courts from access to the Supreme Court by
way of certiorari, however unavailing that might be in reality."'
In the end, however, despite a gestation period of nearly a hundred
years, the benefit of dozens of proposals and countless pages of hearing
testimony, the Federal Circuit legislation provided for certiorari review
without any clear indication of what the long term role of the Supreme
Court was to be in patent cases. Certainly, proponents expected that the
Court would experience short term relief of caseload pressure as the
Federal Circuit took on and resolved what had previously been intercir-
22. See Jack Q. Lever Jr., The New Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Part 1), 64 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 178, 188 (1982).
23. Major reform efforts included a pair of studies recommending the creation of a national appellate
tribunal to be interposed between the existing regional appellate circuits and the Supreme Court. See gen-
erally Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure, and Internal Procedures:
Recommendation for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975) [hereinafter Hruska Comm'n Report]; Federal Judicial
Center Report of the Study Group on the Case Load of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972) (known
popularly as the Freund Committee report).
24. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 402, 96 Stat. 57. For a summary
of the legislative history, see Lever, supra note 22, at 186.
25. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(3), (5)-(14) (1988).
26. See id. § 1295 (a)(1) (specifying that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over "an appeal from a
final decision of a district court of the United States... if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole
or part, on [28 U.S.C. § 1338]"); id. § 1338(a) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.. .
27. See28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1988).
28. Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the Federal Circuit: A Personal Account, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 581, 587
(1992) (citing the availability of Supreme Court review as one of the "important lessons" learned from the
negative responses to Hruska Commission proposals).
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cuit conflicts ripe for Supreme Court review.29 But what of long term
prospects? What was the Supreme Court to do once the Federal Circuit
became established, as is the case today? No one appears to have
thought seriously about the question.
B. Nonstructural Considerations: A Story of Story, and of Douglas
While early Supreme Court involvement in patent law is thus
largely an artifact of the structure of the federal judiciary, the story could
be written from a number of other perspectives as well. Among a host of
"nonstructural" considerations warranting attention here is the influence
of the individual. An appreciation for the Supreme Court's potential fu-
ture role in patent law would be incomplete without consideration of
those few Supreme Court justices who manifested a particular interest in
impacting substantive patent law in the past.
Two interesting stories emerge here. Among early justices, the im-
prints of Justice Joseph Story and, perhaps, Justice Bushrod Washington
are unmistakable. To be sure, their heavy involvement is also partially
explained by structural considerations. Both Story and Washington had
long tenures as judges, both sought diligently to have their cases re-
ported, and both rode circuit in areas of substantial industrial activity.3
Story, however, seemed to have loftier ambitions than merely to influ-
ence the course of patent law through the ordinary course of judicial
opinions. For example, in 1818, he published anonymously a "Note on
the Patent Law,"'" critiquing recent decisions and promoting his own
views on doctrine. His note and his numerous early patent opinions have
succeeded in influencing generations of patent treatise writers.32
Later, Justice Douglas also took a special interest in patent law.
Unfortunately for proponents of the patent system, this special interest
appeared to be born of an unremitting hostility towards both the concept
of a patent system and the reality of patent office operation. Unfortu-
nately, too, Justice Douglas was persuasive and, at moments, eloquent,
proclaiming his disdain for the patent system in a series of infamous out-
bursts of.rhetoric.33 Surely these contributed to Justice Jackson's famous
29. See id. at 588.
30. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 10, at 359. •
31. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) app. 13 (1818).
32. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 10, at 360 n.17 (noting that tributes to Story appeared in two
prominent treatises by Fessenden and Philips, respectively). For the original treatises, see THOMAS G.
FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS (2d ed. 1822), and WILLARD
PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS (1837). For a more recent tribute, see DONALD S.
CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILry, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT, at v
(1978) (offering accolades to Story); see also Frank D. Prager, The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on Ameri-
can Patent Law, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 254 (1961).
33. This is to suggest not that Justice Douglas was alone in his hostility towards the patent system, but
rather that he contributed disproportionately to it. E.g., Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip.
Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The invention, to justify a patent, had to serve
the ends of science-to push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like; to make a distinctive
No. 1]
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warning that the Supreme Court's passion for striking down patents
might lead observers to conclude that "the only patent that is valid is one
which this Court has not been able to get its hands on."34
The lesson here is a modest, but important one: the Supreme
Court's role in patent law, unlike more politically charged areas of Su-
preme Court decision making, may be defined significantly through the
sensibilities of one dominant justice, be it manifested through the wis-
dom of a Story or the intransigence of a Douglas. Any talk of theoretical
models of Supreme Court action in patent cases must be tempered by
this reality. In this regard, it is worth noting, before we proceed to a dis-
cussion of a variety of models, that no Justice Story sits on the current
Supreme Court, by all current indications. But, then again, neither does
a Justice Douglas.
III. MODELS FOR SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING IN PATENT
CASES
This section elaborates on and criticizes two models for Supreme
Court action in patent cases: one labeled the "interventionist" model,
the other the "invisibility" model. As will readily be apparent, perhaps
even from the labels, few would advocate either model in its purest form;
these models are contrivances. In some regards, they might even be face-
tious. They are offered to mark out the extremes, to stimulate a discus-
sion on how one might work inwards from the extremes.
Having constructed and demolished these straw figures, this section
then turns to a discussion of a process-oriented model, an intermediate
model that offers some more realistic prudential guidelines for the Court
in approaching patent cases.
A. Interventionists?
Call the first model, for lack of a better label, the "interventionist"
model. Here, imagine a Supreme Court inspired and impelled: inspired,
perhaps, by the need to guard the balance between incentivizing private
invention and preserving the integrity of the public domain; impelled,
contribution to scientific knowledge."); see also id at 156 ("[The Patent Office] has placed a host of gadgets
under the armour of patents-gadgets that obviously have had no place in the constitutional scheme of
advancing scientific knowledge."); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1944)
(asserting that patents be "narrowly and strictly confined to the precise terms of the grant" in the course of
undermining the contributory infringement cause of action). Justice Douglas also authored the Court's
opinion in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972) (holding that patent claims do not define patent-
eligible subject matter where they would "wholly pre-empt" a mathematical formula and "in practical ef-
fect" be a patent on the underlying algorithm). See generally Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination:
Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8-12
(1997) (collecting cases exemplifying mid-twentieth-century Supreme Court skepticism about the patent
grant).
34. Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560,572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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then, to exercise certiorari jurisdiction routinely in patent cases in order
to write in bold strokes a new patent jurisprudence. Imagine, even, that
this new patent jurisprudence is characterized by scholarly opinions re-
flecting a thorough grasp of relevant doctrine and policy.35
Presumably, no one is fooled: such a model lacks even the most
tenuous claim on reality. Neither the time, temperament, nor resources
of the Supreme Court will allow for the implementation of an interven-
tionist approach to patent decision making. In fact, pragmatists would be
quick to point out that policymakers discarded any serious prospect of a
true interventionist model for the Supreme Court in patent cases at the
turn of the century -the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth, that is.3 6
Even apart from the substantial pragmatic reservations, any pro-
posal for an aggressive interventionist model would encounter many se-
rious conceptual problems.
1. Tension with Structural Arrangements
First, any moderately vigorous interventionist model squarely con-
travenes existing structural arrangements in the judiciary. The legislative
history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act reflects the view that one
of the core premises on which the Federal Circuit was created was to "fill
the void" left in substantive patent law by the infrequency of Supreme
Court enunciations.37 Similarly, Federal Circuit judges have expressed
the understanding that relieving pressure on the Supreme Court's docket
is a raison d'etre for the Federal Circuit. 8 Judge Markey even went so
35. Operating as we are in the realm of hypotheticals, we may as well also imagine that these schol-
arly opinions contain abundant citations to the worthy writings of distinguished patent law scholars and
commentators.
36. As Justice Frankfurter wrote:
The [Evarts] Act of 1891, however, while relieving the Supreme Court of the drain of patent
litigation brought new difficulties for patent litigants.... [Tihe Act of 1891 vested finality of pat-
ent jurisdiction in the circuit courts of appeals, subject only to certification and certiorari-
methods of review only seldom to be invoked. Uniformity was thus replaced by the threatened
diversity of nine appellate courts of corrdinate jurisdiction....
Relief through the Supreme Court was not to be hoped for. The condition of its docket and the
general increase in federal litigation indicated that future legislation would curtail still more, and not
enlarge, the obligatory appellate powers of the Supreme Court.
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 177-78.
37. According to the Committee Report on the legislation creating the Federal Circuit, "[tihe infre-
quency of Supreme Court review of patent cases leaves the present judicial system without any effective
means of assuring even-handedness nationwide in the administration of the patent laws. The proposed new
court will fill this void." H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 22 (1981). The Hruska Commission, discussing a pro-
posal for a single national appellate court, observed, "[tjhe Supreme Court has set, and can be expected to
continue to set, national policy in the area of patent law as in other areas of federal law. However, the
Court should not be expected to perform a monitoring function on a continuing basis in this complex field."
Hruska Comm'n Report, supra note 23, at 220;, see also Abate & Fish, supra note 6, at 333 (concluding that
the Supreme Court's apparent unwillingness to take on matters of substantive patent law is not surprising in
view of the reasons for creation of the Federal Circuit in the first place).
38. See S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional
Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 853, 855 (1990) (assert-
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far as to suggest that the Federal Circuit perceived itself as "the probable
court of last resort in most of its cases."39 Interventionist proposals in-
herently lie in tension with these fundamental rationales for the existence
of the Federal Circuit.
2. Objections to Specialized Courts
Second, to deserve any credence interventionist proposals would
need to demonstrate persuasively that the Federal Circuit has failed as
an experiment in "specialized" adjudication. In the early 1980's, oppo-
nents of the Federal Circuit legislation drew upon a familiar litany of ar-
guments from the literature on specialized courts. Those arguments
failed to carry the day then, and might be even more difficult to sustain
today. That, however, is a proposition worth addressing rigorously, es-
pecially because the specialized courts arguments can now be reexam-
ined against the backdrop of nearly twenty years' experience with Fed-
eral Circuit adjudication.'
Opponents of specialized courts fear that judges on such courts will
suffer from intellectual isolation, resulting in an eventual stagnation of
the court's jurisprudence.4' This objection has long been part of the de-
ing that one objective for creating the Federal Circuit "was to relieve some of the pressure on the Supreme
Court caused by the need to monitor intercircuit differences in these areas").
39. Howard T. Markey, The Federal Circuit and Congressional Intent, 2 FED. CIR. B.J. 303, 304
(1992).
40. Enthusiasm for this line of reasoning should, however, be tempered at the outset by the caveat
that the Federal Circuit may not be a specialized court at all -or at least might not fit well with stereotypi-
cal conceptions of such a court. Congress took pains to express this view. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 19
(1981) (insisting that "[t]he proposed new court is not a 'specialized' court" because the Federal Circuit
was deliberately provided with jurisdiction that would yield a varied docket, and because the Federal Cir-
cuit was formed from a combination of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
suggesting that it must necessarily be less specialized than its predecessors).
Predictably, Federal Circuit judges themselves resist the notion that they are "specialized judges" or
that their tribunal is "specialized." E.g., Pauline Newman, The Sixth Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture:
Commentary on the Paper by Professor Dreyfuss, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 53, 58-60 (1995); Pauline New-
man, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial Activism?, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 683, 683-84
(1993); Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1003, 1012
(1991) ("In the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Congress did not intend to create a special-
ized court."). Judge Plager, in particular, is adamant on the point:
Probably, the clearest lesson to be drawn both from the literature and from experience is that the
term "specialized" should be dropped from the discussion, since there is no agreement on what it
means or on what it connotes. In terms of Federal Circuit caseload, while the formal jurisdiction
of the court is defined by subject matter (which itself is substantially varied), the kinds of issues
dealt with by any particular judge of the court is a function of the luck of the draw in cases and,
over time, will run a wide gamut of legal issues.
Plager, supra note 38, at 860 (citation omitted); see also id. at 863 (calling for scholars to distinguish between
specialized subject matter and "the notion of a specialized court staffed by 'specialized judges,"' in critiqu-
ing Richard Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1111
(1990)).
41. E.g., Hruska Comm'n Report, supra note 23, at 234-35 (noting the objection that the quality of
specialized courts' decision making would diminish "as the specialized judges become subject to 'tunnel
vision,' seeing the cases in a narrow perspective without the insights stemming from broad exposure to legal
problems in a variety of fields"); Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 3 (listing intellectual isolation as a commonly
argued objection to specialized tribunals).
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bate over specialized patent courts,42 and arose in debates over the Fed-
eral Circuit legislation.43
Federal Circuit experience to date suggests several responses. First,
cross-fertilization of a kind that invigorates the decision-making process
in a generalist regime can still proceed in the existing "specialized" pat-
ent regime. For example, district court signaling may reduce the poten-
tial for serious Federal Circuit isolation. Suppose that the Federal Cir-
cuit issues an awkward, unfortunate, or outright wrong patent decision.
District courts saddled with the obligation of applying the decision in fu-
ture cases might be expected to apply a limiting gloss, or to offer com-
mentary exposing weaknesses of the Federal Circuit decision. Even
where district courts obediently apply Federal Circuit precedent, a truly
bad Federal Circuit decision is likely to spawn abundant litigation, which
may itself signal the Federal Circuit and prompt reconsideration on sub-
sequent cases. 4
Opponents 'of specialized courts may also simply be misapprehend-
ing judicial temperament by assuming that judges who deal regularly
with specialized subject matter become transformed into "specialized"
judges, that term implying an inability to comprehend or absorb main-
stream legal thinking.45 The chasm between specialized tribunal and spe-
cialized judge is a large one and should not be overlooked.' The breadth
42. E.g., Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judici-
ary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425, 426 (1951) (arguing that judicial specialization in the patent area would give rise to
tunnel vision among jurists), cited in Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization, Litigant Influence, and Sub-
stantive Policy: The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 823,824 n.5 (1977).
43. E.g., Lever, supra note 22, at 201 n.68 (pointing out that, according to opponents of the Federal
Circuit legislation, intercircuit conflicts in patent law were healthy in that they spurred Supreme Court re-
view "and growth in the law, absent opportunity for diversity of views the law will stagnate and rigidify rais-
ing the question of whether any case would get to the Supreme Court").
44. See iti (arguing that "even a wrongheaded doctrine enunciated and enforced by an all-powerful
specialist appeals court is subject to revisitation in subsequent cases" because "[p]revailing theory suggests
that problematic legal rules are more likely to be relitigated").
45. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 67, 96 (1995). Stem-
pel also notes:
[Tihe cross-fertilization argument is caricatured. Simply because a judge sits on a specialized
court does not mean that he or she is a narrow person with no interest in law or life generally.
Just as specialist lawyers have broad professional and personal interests, so do specialist judges.
There is no solid basis for assuming that specialist judges are any more provincial than are judges,
law professors and lawyers generally.
Id.
46. Judge Plager questions whether the structure of a "specialized" tribunal invariably gives rise to a
mentality of narrow-mindedness among jurists of the tribunal:
Judges confronted with large and highly diverse caseloads may tend to stereotype the cases, see-
ing little of the variation within rather than across subject matter. Consequently such judges may
actually be more narrow in their approach to these cases. Judges who serve on a court of special-
ized jurisdiction, by contrast, may have presented to them a full range of cases covering a panoply
of issues within that subject area. They may treat the merits of each case with greater care and
understanding. Given the potential diversity of issues even within a single subject matter area
and the vagaries of human character (judges being no exception), generalization on this point is
risky.
Plager, supra note 38, at 859.
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of the Federal Circuit's nonpatent jurisdictional grant surely plays a role
here as well in preventing the Federal Circuit from isolating itself.
Accordingly, inherent features of the existing judicial arrangements
for patent law may blunt the intellectual isolation claim. Of course,
blunting it differs from eliminating it. Federal Circuit patent jurispru-
dence has occasionally demonstrated a tendency towards myopia. For
example, academics would presumably fault the court for the paucity of
its citations to scholarly literature in patent opinions.47 Some might iden-
tify manifestations of a provincial attitude in some aspects of the court's
jurisprudence.48 Based on the Federal Circuit experience in patent law, it
would seem reasonable to conclude that fears of intellectual isolationism
were exaggerated, but cannot be dismissed entirely. Some level of Su-
preme Court monitoring short of aggressive interventionism may be im-
portant to ensure that the Federal Circuit maintains its resistance to tun-
nel vision.49
Opponents of specialized courts have also frequently worried that
such tribunals would be viewed as inferior and would fail to attract tal-
ented judges." This objection simply does not seem to have been real-
ized in Federal Circuit experience to date. Quite to the contrary, the
Federal Circuit can boast of being the only appellate tribunal of national
influence, and as perhaps the world's leading patents court, can claim a
healthy measure of international influence as well. There is no evidence
to suggest that Federal Circuit judgeships are viewed as low prestige po-
sitions or that the appointment process has yielded only candidates
whom otherwise would never be considered for positions in the appellate
judiciary.
3. Public Choice Theory
Finally, an argument for an interventionist model for Supreme
Court decision making in patent cases could also draw upon predictions
from the literature of public choice theory that specialized courts would
47. Of course, this might only prove that scholars are as self-interested as anyone else.
48. Manifested, for example, in the court's failure to cite foreign-patent precedent dealing with
analogous issues. But cf Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing
foreign patent precedent on the meaning of "offer for sale" in the infringement context). Similarly, some
might claim that the Federal Circuit considers patent policy with little or no appreciation of countervailing
arguments from competition policy. This may gradually change as a result of the Federal Circuit's new-
found zeal to create its own law on the subject. See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d
1059,1067-68 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 876 (1998).
49. The specialized courts literature contains some suggestions that an optimal arrangement would
supply specialized courts with meaningful generalist court review. E.g., Stempel, supra note 45, at 112-19
(arguing for specialized trial level courts with generalist appellate review).
50. See Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984?: An Essay on
Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL L. REv. 761, 779-80 (1983) (questioning
whether a "high quality federal appeals bench" could sustain itself on a diet consisting solely of appeals in
discrete substantive areas such as patents); see also Hruska Comm'n Report, supra note 23, at 235 (referring
to similar concerns about quality of appointees).
[Vol. 2001
THE AGE OF THE INVISIBLE SUPREME COURT
be uniquely vulnerable to capture by special interest groups. Public
choice theory builds upon the premise that a rational politician will act to
maximize his or her utility (defined in terms of retaining office)." Inter-
est groups can intervene to alter the politician's calculus of social costs
and benefits. 2 In particular, powerful interest groups might influence a
legislator to act contrary to probable constituent wishes by offering po-
litical benefits that exceed the costs of diverging from constituents'
wishes. 3 Where the issue involves the creation of a specialized court or
the appointment of judges to that court, interest group influence may be
particularly powerful because the matter may be of little interest to the
public generally, suggesting that the political costs of acting contrary to
constituents' best interest are likely to be low. 4
Commentators routinely have voiced concerns about capture and
resultant bias in debates over specialized courts generally," and in de-
bates over the creation of a patents court.56 Persuasive evidence of cap-
ture of the Federal Circuit would certainly justify an aggressively inter-
ventionist approach to review on the part of the Supreme Court. 7
The capture issue is worthy of a much fuller and more nuanced ex-
ploration than this brief essay will attempt to provide. However, a brief
examination raises questions about the extent to which it would support
an interventionist model.
First, public choice theoretical predictions about the formation of
the Federal Circuit do not appear to square with the reality. A superfi-
cially plausible public choice account would presumably have predicted
that wealthy patent owners (and patent lawyers) would have coalesced to
pressure Congress to create a specialized patents court and to populate it
with "pro-patent" judges. But even a superficial perusal of the legislative
history reveals flaws in such an account. Patent lawyers, for example,
were deeply split over proposals for the creation of the Federal Circuit.58
Perhaps more importantly, the politics of patent enforcement may
simply not be conducive to the formation of special interest groups. In-
dividual players in the patent system may well be unable to predict
whether they are more likely to be patent enforcers or targets of patent
enforcement actions. Large high technology companies are likely to be
both, simultaneously. As a result,, patent litigation does not inevitably
51. See Stempel, supra note 45, at 101-02.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id at 101 (reciting the thesis of the "interest group prong of public choice theory"). Of
course, to the extent that the interest group reflects public sentiment generally, the intervention of the in-
terest group would seem to represent harmless error.
55. E.g., id. at 97 ("Perhaps the most serious charge against specialized courts, besides the quality
problem, is that they are more prone to interest group dominance or even 'capture."').
56. E.g., Hruska Comm'n Report, supra note 23, at 235 (noting concerns about the quality of ap-
pointees and the ability of special interest groups to dominate the appointments process).
57. Presumably it would justify the examination of legislative reforms as well.
58. E.g., Hruska Comm'n Report, supra note 23, at 236.
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lend itself to stereotypical interest group alignments. 9 Conceivably, pat-
ent enforcement litigation is inherently balanced, and this inherent bal-
ance discourages capture.' This is consistent with the observations of
some commentators that public choice predictions may overlook the
likelihood that as an interest group forms and applies pressure, compet-
ing interest groups may spring up to blunt the impact of the first.6"
A second way to consider the question of Federal Circuit capture,
and hence the potential need for vigorous Supreme Court oversight, is to
work backwards -to assess Federal Circuit performance to date and to
consider whether case outcomes reflect probable interest group influence
in either the creation of the Federal Circuit or the appointments process.
This is well-trod ground, ordinarily taking the form of an inquiry into
whether the Federal Circuit is biased in favor of patents.
Empirical as well as impressionistic studies of Federal Circuit per-
formance have presented mixed results on the question of Federal Cir-
cuit "bias" in favor of patents.62 Empirical studies, for example, have
provided a basis for concluding that the Federal Circuit adjudicates pat-
ent validity generously to patent holders, and more generously than
predecessor appellate tribunals as a whole.63 However, it is not clear that
59. E.g., small entity v. large entity, or private entity v. government.
60. For a persuasive argument along these lines, see Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 29-30. The proposi-
tion that patent litigation is inherently balanced is an intriguing question, especially in view of increasingly
strident claims on behalf of individual inventors that the patent system is biased in favor of large corpora-
tions. On a related cautionary note, patent enforcement should be distinguished here from patent acquisi-
tion. Patent acquisition would, of course, invariably involve a private entity as a petitioner and the govern-
ment (the PTO) as respondent. In theory, bias would have a greater likelihood of taking root. Indeed, the
CCPA, whose appellate jurisdiction extended only to ex parte appeals from the PTO, and not to patent
enforcement matters generally, was arguably subject to this problem. E.g., id. at 29 n.176 (noting the con-
trast and concluding that these criticisms of the CCPA would not extend to the Federal Circuit).
61. See Stempel, supra note 45, at 101.
62. Perhaps the most sophisticated study can be found in Dreyfuss, supra note 7. An updated study
would be a welcome addition to the literature. Professor Dreyfuss also offers a methodology for assessing
the performance of specialized courts in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of
Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 11-16 (1995) (evaluating the suc-
cess of specialized courts in terms of three "constellations" of issues: decision-making quality (accuracy,
precision, coherence); efficiency (measured principally by the speed with which specialized courts resolve
issues); and due process. or at least the perception of due process, which might include considerations of
inherent bias). In her 1995 study, Professor Dreyfuss scores the Federal Circuit high on coherence. See id.
at 13-14 (observing that "while many commentators express concern that the [Federal Circuit] overly pro-
tects patentees, its ability to articulate coherent patent policy, without doubt, has contributed significantly
to its public acceptance").
63. For a careful study examining a database of district court and Federal Circuit decisions from
1989-1996, see John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents,
26 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 185, 205-06 (1998) (finding that the overall rate of courts determining
validity favorably to patentees is higher after the creation of the Federal Circuit than before, but stopping
short of offering broad conclusions about Federal Circuit bias). For a study of precedential and nonprece-
dential Federal Circuit decisions from October 1, 1982 through March 15, 1994, see Donald R. Dunner et
al., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit's Patent Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. OR. B.J. 151, 154-55
(1995) (concluding that the Federal Circuit was more likely to affirm validity judgments in favor of patent
owners than accused infringers). See also Ronald B. Coolley, What the Federal Circuit has Done and How
Often. Statistical Study of the CAFC Patent Decisions-1982 to 1988, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 385 (1989).
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the Federal Circuit is especially generous to patentees on patent in-
fringement issues.' Moreover, those who assume that the Federal Cir-
cuit is biased in favor of patent validity, or patents generally, disagree
over the normative implications.65 At the risk of oversimplifying a topic
that is bound to attract scholarly attention for many years to come, one
might simply conclude for present purposes that Federal Circuit per-
formance appraisals are too mixed to support an extreme interventionist
model for Supreme Court action.
B. Invisibles?
It may be instructive to juxtapose against the "interventionist"
model another model lying at the opposite extreme-an "invisibility"
model. Here, the Supreme Court cedes all authority over substantive
patent law issues to the Federal Circuit. Under the invisibility model, the
Supreme Court exists, for substantive patent law purposes, only as a mat-
ter of theoretical possibility.' That is, the patent community universally
perceives that the Supreme Court might be summoned forth if the cor-
rect incantation is invoked, but, under the invisibility model, few believe
that they will actually ever see it occur. This model, though admittedly
hyperbolical in its rhetoric, might actually have a fair amount of descrip-
tive force. But considered normatively, its flaws are manifest.
64. Dunner et al., found the Federal Circuit slightly more likely to affirm a finding of infringement
than a finding of no infringement. See Dunner et al., supra note 63, at 155. However, restricted to the last
five years of the study period, the chances of affirmance were very close irrespective of whether the lower
court ruling was infringement or no infringement. See id.
65. E.g., Lawrence G. Kastriner, The Revival of Confidence in the Patent System, 73 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 5,8 (1991) ("The CAFC has not only succeeded in bringing about uniformity and
certainty in interpretation of the patent laws-the express purpose for which it was established-but has
also significantly enhanced the economic power of patents."); Gerald Sobel, The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit: A Fifth Anniversary Look at Its Impact on Patent Law and Litigation, 37 AM. U. L. REV.
1087, 1090-91 (1988) (asserting that primarily by fostering a climate more favorable to patent validity, the
Federal Circuit succeeded in its initial five years in strengthening "the incentive to innovate"); cf Allan N.
Littman, Restoring the Balance of Our Patent System, 37 IDEA 545, 552 (1997) (arguing that "good inten-
tions have gone awry" in the operation of the Federal Circuit, because "the Federal Circuit has in many
areas fundamentally shifted the balance of the patent system to favor the patent holder").
66. Or, alternatively, it does not exist at all. Consider an arrangement by which Congress decided to
oust the Supreme Court altogether from review of the Federal Circuit's patent decisions. The issue here
would be whether eliminating certiorari jurisdiction over patent matters would properly lie within the ex-
ceptions clause of Article III (providing that the Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in cases within the
judicial power of the United States "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make"). The literature on the extent of Congressional control over the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is
substantial and would seem to afford various answers. E.g., Henry J. Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's
Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. REV. 53 (1962); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Con-
straints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 ViLL L. REV. 929
(1981-82); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under
the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 ViLL L. REV. 900 (1981-82); Charles E.
Rice, Congress and the Supreme Court's Jurisdiction, 27 VILL L. REV. 959 (1981-82); William S. Dodge,
Note, Congressional Control of Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: Why the Original Jurisdiction Clause
Suggests an "Essential Role", 100 YALE L.J. 1013 (1991).
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1. Structural Objections
First, there is an obvious structural objection to the invisibility
model. Congress deliberately gave the Supreme Court certiorari jurisdic-
tion. Indeed, it appears that every legislative proposal to create a spe-
cialized patents court in the United States, tracing back to 1877, contem-
plated Supreme Court review of the specialized court by certiorari or
otherwise.67 Perhaps Supreme Court review was included as a matter of
rote, of political expediency, or for its symbolic value.68 But it seems
equally plausible to posit that proponents expected the Supreme Court
actually to do something with its authority beyond dealing with the un-
usual instances of Constitutional questions arising from cases that hap-
pen to involve patents.
2. Decision-Making Dynamics in a Maturing Federal Circuit
Moreover, there are powerful institutional reasons for the Court to
make deliberate efforts to deploy its authority to review substantive pat-
ent issues, whether or not that grant of authority was initially viewed as
merely symbolic. As discussed below, these reasons are becoming more
compelling as the Federal Circuit matures.
As a result of the Federal Circuit's monopoly over substantive pat-
ent law adjudication, the consequences of systematic Supreme Court re-
cusal from patent law are serious- more serious, perhaps, than would be
the case of Supreme Court invisibility in other areas of civil litigation
deemed especially narrow, especially complex, or both. Unlike other ar-
eas of its jurisprudence, Supreme Court silence in substantive patent law
readily allows the Federal Circuit to anoint itself a de facto court of last
resort in patents. Once this has occurred (and it may well have occurred
already), it is likely to become increasingly difficult over time for the Su-
preme Court to recapture its ceded power. This may be due in part to an
erosion of competence at the Supreme Court to deal with patent matters
after a long hiatus. Perhaps more significantly, however, it may be due to
an erosion of the Supreme Court's power to speak credibly on matters of
substantive patent law, in a manner likely to elicit deference (and obedi-
ence) from the patent community.
Posner has made similar observations. He notes that an appellate
body that monopolizes a discrete substantive area might be expected "to
evolve a distinctive, even esoteric legal culture that will be difficult for
any generalist body to fathom. '69 He proceeds to suggest that experience
67. See SINGLE COURT, supra note 12, at 5-9 (Table 1, listing legislative proposals from 1877 to
1899); id. at 25-28 (Table 2, listing legislative proposals from 1936 to 1957).
68. See Meador, supra note 28, at 587.
69. RicHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 257 (1996).
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with the Federal Circuit may demonstrate "that decisions by a special-
ized court resist effective control by a higher generalist court."7
This argument can be extended. One may wonder whether the
gradual erosion of a reviewing court's authority affects the expert tribu-
nal's behavior in preparing and writing opinions. For any "specialized"
court that monopolizes a substantive area, one should be concerned
about the possibility that the specialized court may have less incentive
than corresponding generalist courts to develop and carefully articulate a
defensible rationale for its decisions, knowing that no other sister tribu-
nal will have the opportunity to pass on the same issue.71 This concern is
greatly heightened if the court that is vested with responsibility for re-
viewing the specialized court cannot reasonably exercise that authority.
The phenomenon by which a generalist reviewing court gradually
loses its actual authority to exercise meaningful control over a specialized
inferior court deserves close attention by the Supreme Court and the
patent community. It may turn out to be a weakness inherent in our ju-
risdictional allocation for patent law, one needing fairly rapid redress.
Ironically, values of certainty and uniformity in patent decision
making could also be impacted negatively by continued adherence to a
de facto invisibility model. Proponents of the concept of the Federal
Circuit routinely have cited enhanced certainty and uniformity as the
fruits of specialized adjudication.7" Certainly, it is plausible to conceive
of a scenario in which the Federal Circuit aggressively regularizes patent
doctrine, damping out doctrinal oscillations over time to the point where
the need for Supreme Court oversight gradually diminishes. One could
even argue that Federal Circuit experience, at least with selected doc-
trines, demonstrates admirably the propensity for the Federal Circuit to
drive patent law towards equilibrium.73
But is this inevitable? That is, does our experience with the Federal
Circuit demonstrate that as a specialized subject matter tribunal matures,
it will necessarily, inevitably drive its subject matter area towards equi-
librium?
There are several reasons to suspect that increased certainty and
uniformity are not the inevitable byproducts of a maturing Federal Cir-
cuit. Compare the political dynamic of the Federal Circuit at its creation
to the political dynamic of the Federal Circuit today. At its creation, as a
70. Id
71. See Hruska Comm'n Report, supra note 23, at 235 (acknowledging this concern).
72. E.g., Stempel, supra note 45, at 88-89 (noting that the advantages of specialized adjudication are
generally held to include "improved precision and predictability of adjudication; more accurate adjudica-
tion; more coherent articulation of legal standards; greater expertise of the bench; economies of scale that
flow from division of labor, particularly including speed, reduced costs and greater efficiency through
streamlining of repetitive tasks and wasted motions"); Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 2 (including among tradi-
tional justifications for specialized courts the benefit of efficiency resulting from the specialized tribunal's
superior capacity to inject doctrinal stability).
73. For example, as Professor Dreyfuss pointed out, the Federal Circuit performed exceptionally in
its early tenure in stabilizing the obviousness standard of 35 U.S.C. § 103. See Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 9.
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stranger to the patent community and an experiment in adjudication, the
Federal Circuit had an immediate need to demonstrate that it could
speak credibly, and command respect commensurate with the statutory
scope of its power. At a minimum, the Federal Circuit needed to dem-
onstrate basic competence in carrying out the apparent Congressional
mandate for uniformity74- in short, to justify its existence, in the manner
of any other novice. Relatedly, it seems quite possible that several of the
Federal Circuit judges (especially those recruited from the ranks of the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) had long felt a normative impulse
to stabilize patent law but could only act on that impulse after appellate
jurisdiction was reorganized.
These forces surely motivated the Federal Circuit to speak power-
fully with one voice at its creation.7 ' But what of today? As an institu-
tion, the Federal Circuit is not only a fait accompli, but also widely
lauded as the world's most influential patents court. Having established
its preeminence in the patent community and perhaps beyond, the Fed-
eral Circuit's need to arrogate power to itself is far less urgent (if it be a
need at all) and, concomitantly, individual Federal Circuit judges may
perceive less of a need to exhibit solidarity to the outside world. Further,
backgrounds of judges on the Federal Circuit are quite diverse today as
compared to the original Federal Circuit.76 And, there are simply more
cases in the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence, providing greater potential
for inconsistencies.
Accordingly, we should not be too quick to accept the proposition
that the Federal Circuit, or any other similarly constituted specialized
tribunal, is likely inevitably to produce more uniform results over time.
Contrary scenarios may be equally plausible.
3. Other Objections
Supreme Court invisibility in patent cases is problematic for a num-
ber of additional reasons. One derives from the potential positive impact
of the Court's status as an outsider to the patent system: outsiders might
supply an important moderating influence over experts. Ultimately, this
proposition turns on an important empirical inquiry about the behavior
74. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20 (1981) ("The new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will
provide nationwide uniformity in patent law, will make the rules applied in patent litigation more predict-
able and will eliminate the expensive, time-consuming and unseemly forum-shopping that characterizes
litigation in the field.").
75. The backgrounds of the original court members also were surely a contributing factor. Judges on
the original court came from the same court-the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. For biographical
information on Federal Circuit judges, see UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE
BICENTENNIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT. A HISTORY, 1982-1990 (1991); US. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Judicial Biographies, at http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.htmil (last visited Apr. 10, 2000).
76. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Judicial Biographies, at http://www.fedcir.gov/
judgbios.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2000).
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of expert tribunals. Posner has argued that experts are likely to be ex-
tremely sensitive to shifts in thinking, which might lead to severe vacilla-
tion in the jurisprudence of a specialized court.77 But there is an equally
plausible opposing claim: a true "hard-core" expert might actually be
more bound than a generalist to a particular ideology, and less likely to
vacillate. 8
Case volume may play a role here, too. Federal Circuit judges con-
front a -volume of patent cases unequalled in the history of the federal
judiciary (except, perhaps, in the case of CCPA judges). Professor Drey-
fuss sees advantages in this concentration. In particular, she has argued
that it is advantageous to give a single tribunal a critical mass of patent
cases, which "provides ... judges with the motivation, as well as the time,
to elaborate upon the law" and likewise gives the court "the ability to
wait for the best vehicle for considering and repairing" patent law prob-
lems.79  .
In a recent article, two commentators point out that the very condi-
tions that allow accretion of this critical mass (and the crucial expertise to
accompany it) may also give rise to an unfortunate phenomenon that
they. entitle "judicial hyperactivity."8 According to this argument, the
"familiarity and expertise of the Federal Circuit judges with issues com-
mon to the court's specialized jurisdiction" may tempt the court to in-
dulge in "judicial hyperactivity," resulting in usurpation of the fact-
finder's role.81
This is an important question deserving of careful study, both for
what it would tell us about optimal operation of the Federal Circuit, and
for the broader lessons about formulating specialized tribunals. In the
interim, however, it would be rash to dispense with generalist court re-
view before we know more about the dynamics of expertise on special-
ized tribunals.
77. See Posner, supra note 50, at 781-82.
78. See Stempel, supra note 45, at 104.
79. Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 66 n.338. Federal Circuit Judge Randall Rader has also spoken of Fed-
eral Circuit judges' unprecedented exposure to patent law on a judge-by-judge basis, arguing that it may
lead to an "acceleration of common law evolution" in patent law. Randall Rader, Address at Washington
University School of Law (Apr. 2000). Such an acceleration, it would seem, could result either in positive
change or in hypersensitivity in any given case. In either event, the phenomenon deserves further study.
80. William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit's Discom-
fort with its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 726 (2000). According to the authors, "judicial
hyperactivity" seems to describe "what happens when an intermediate appellate court usurps elements of
the decision-making process that are supposed to be the province of the lower courts, administrative bod-
ies, or even litigants." Id at 727 (distinguishing the concept from judicial activism).
81. Id at 729. The Hruska Commission noted a similar concern. See Hruska Comm'n Report, supra
note 23, at 235 (observing that judges in a specialized court, having acquired expertise, "might impose their
own views of policy even where the scope of review under the applicable law is supposed to be more lim-
ited").
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A final objection to utter Supreme Court invisibility in patent cases
concerns the resolution of "boundary" problems.82 These problems -
Federal Circuit jurisdiction, Federal Circuit choice of law -have proven
vexing in the Federal Circuit's short history.83 Moreover, these problems
present an especially compelling case for Supreme Court intervention. It
may be awkward, for example, for the Federal Circuit to act as the final
arbiter of its own jurisdiction. Presumably even the warmest adherents
of Federal Circuit autonomy would concede that Supreme Court invisi-
bility in boundary disputes would be counterproductive for patent law.
C. Managers?
The pure interventionist and the pure laissez faire invisibility mod-
els-"caricatures" might be a better label than "models" -offer impor-
tant lessons about optimizing generalist court review of a limited subject
matter tribunal. Experience so far with the Federal Circuit tends to pro-
vide reassurance that structural arrangements encouraging Federal Cir-
cuit autonomy, and discouraging routine Supreme Court intervention in
patent law, were well-considered. It demonstrates that the Supreme
Court was correct in avoiding vigorous intervention early in the Federal
Circuit's tenure, and would seem to counsel against a move to any vigor-
ous interventionist approach in the future. At the same time, the Su-
preme Court's observance of a prudential model of de facto invisibility
poses significant concerns. As the Federal Circuit matures, voluntary
Supreme Court invisibility may become terminal Supreme Court invisi-
bility. Supreme Court abstention, even if modulated by periodic, cameo
appearances, does not promise optimality in substantive patent law deci-
sion making. An intermediate model is required.
1. Intracircuit Conflict Model
One response is to construct an intermediate model that simply
places the Court where it often is in federal law matters: as a sort of be-
82. See Stempel, supra note 45, at 108-09 (identifying the emergence of boundary disputes as a pre-
dictable disadvantage of specialized tribunals and discussing solutions).
83. Professor Dreyfuss would go further, suggesting that boundary disputes may signal more funda-
mental conceptual problems:
The issues that are troubling the CAFC-whether it has power to decide the law, dispose of
cases, and supervise -are the very issues that define what it means to be a court. Thus, it is not
surprising that these questions will remain intractable so long as the CAFC lacks a coherent vi-
sion of itself, of its position in the federal court system, and of its role in shaping competition pol-
icy.
Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 52-53. Professor Dreyfuss also faults the Supreme Court's limited effort to
assert itself in Federal Circuit boundary disputes. See id. at 31 (charging that the Court has "thor-
oughly failed to grapple with the unique problems that the CAFC presents to the federal system"). In
particular, she criticizes the Supreme Court's Christianson decision, which imposed the well-pleaded
complaint rule for Federal Circuit subject matter jurisdiction and, accordingly, gave rise to the poten-
tial that cases involving patent issues that arose outside the well-pleaded complaint would become
"stranded in the regional circuits or the state courts." Id. at 34.
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nign hallway monitor stepping in to resolve intercircuit conflicts, but only
when they have become so heated that bloodshed might result. Patent
law is a different creature in this regard too; there are no true intercircuit
conflicts.' It would be easy enough, however, for the Court to construct
a vision of itself as a monitor of intracircuit conflicts in Federal Circuit
patent decisions. Judge Nies, for example, argued that given the absence
of any genuine intercircuit conflicts, the Supreme Court would do well to
give special consideration to dissents in Federal Circuit opinions, and use
the presence of dissents as a major impetus for Supreme Court review."
This is a very conventional proposal, but presents a number of prob-
lems. A first concern derives again from structural considerations.
Cumbersome though it may be,86 the en banc practice enables the Fed-
eral Circuit to impose a governing rule in the face of an intracircuit
split,87 suggesting that the "conflict monitor" model may not satisfactorily
capture the Supreme Court's role. Second, Supreme Court attention to
Federal Circuit dissents could be counterproductive; it may set the re-
view threshold too low, allowing the views of a single Federal Circuit
judge to trigger Supreme Court intervention.
Finally, and most significantly, an intermediate "conflict monitor"
model presents too impoverished a vision of the Supreme Court's poten-
tial for playing a positive role in substantive patent law decision making.
Such a model would seem to be guided solely by the principle that there
is value in having a settled rule' 8- perhaps irrespective of the wisdom of
the rule. Such a model would do little to provide any overarching, co-
herent vision of the Supreme Court's place among institutions of the pat-
ent system.
84. There could, of course, be intercircuit conflicts where current Federal Circuit practice conflicts
with prior regional appellate decisions. Pfaff purports to present such a conflict. See infra notes 107-08,
113 and accompanying text (analyzing Pfaffl.
85. See Helen W. Nies, Dissents at the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court Review, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
1519, 1519-21 (1996).
86. Judge Nies appeared to take the view that logistical difficulties inherent in the en banc proce-
dures thwarted widespread use of en banc practice to harmonize arguably conflicting panel opinions. See
id. at 1520.
87. Concededly, some Federal Circuit en banc decisions seem to settle very little, especially when
they feature perplexing arrays of partial concurrences, partial dissents, and "additional views." E.g., Hilton
Davis Chen. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (per curiam opinion with concur-
ring opinion filed by Newman, J.; dissenting opinion fied by Plager, J., joined by Archer, C.J., Rich, J., and
Lourie, J.; dissenting opinion filed by Lourie, J., joined by Rich, J. and Plager, J.; dissenting opinion filed by
Nies, J., joined in part by Archer, CJ.); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (opinion by Rich, J.;
concurring and dissenting opinion by Archer, CJ., joined by Nie, J.; concurring opinions by Newman, J.,
Plager, J., and Rader, J.; dissenting opinion by Mayer, J., joined by Michel, J.; dissenting opinion by Schall,
J., joined by Clevenger, J.); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (opin-
ion by Bissell, J.; dissenting in part opinion by Bennett, J., joined by Cowen, J., Smith, J., and Newman, J.;
separate opinion by Newman, J.; "additional views" by Nies, J.).
88. To be sure, having a settled rule might itself be a considerable feat in some areas of patent doc-
trine. See Thomas K. Landry, Certainty and Discretion in Patent Law: The On Sale Bar, the Doctrine of
Equivalents, and Judicial Power in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. CAL L. REv. 1151, 1169 (1994) (identifying
doctrinal areas in which the Federal Circuit has arguably failed to take into account the likelihood that the
value of simply having a settled rule will be high).
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2. A Managerial Model
Consider, instead, a managerial model of Supreme Court review of
Federal Circuit patent decisions. Such a model might operate on two ba-
sic principles:
(1) The Supreme Court should grant certiorari in patent cases to re-
view substantive patent issues only where there is a compelling issue of
the allocation of power among institutional actors at stake, which will of-
ten manifest itself as an issue of the process by which such actors have
taken a decision.
(2) When the Supreme Court does intervene, the Supreme Court
should ordinarily limit its opinion in accordance with its rationale for in-
tervention. That is, the Supreme Court should ordinarily take care to see
that its opinions are framed as decisions about allocating power. Pro-
nouncements about substantive patent law standards should be couched
in terms of the allocation of decision-making authority, thus delegating
to other actors (presumably either the Federal Circuit or the PTO) the
work of articulating and refining the substantive standards.
This proposal takes significant lessons from Estreicher and Sexton's
"managerial" model of Supreme Court decision making.89 The manage-
rial model is built upon a pair of pragmatic considerations: first, that the
Court's judicial resources are limited, such that it would be impossible
for the Court as currently constituted to deliver definitive decisions on
every important federal question that may come before it; and second,
that the Court must take care to deploy its limited judicial resources most
efficiently by acting "with great care before it finally resolves a question
of federal law."'
As would be expected, a central premise of a managerial model is
that the Supreme Court deliberately pursue careful delegation. In this
context, delegation is institutionalized via a presumption of regularity:
Except in special situations justifying immediate intervention, how-
ever the Court as manager should accord a presumption of regular-
ity and validity to the decisions of state and lower federal
courts .... The Supreme Court as manager would trust the subor-
dinate actors in the judicial system, intervening only when some
89. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING T1HE SUPREME COURT's ROLE: A
THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROcESS 50 (1986) [hereinafter ESTREICHER & SEXTON,
REDEFINING]. The Court asserted that:
The reality of scarce resources dictates that the Court conceive of its role not in isolation, as an
oracle issuing definitive rulings on national law, but as a manager of a process of federal law ad-
judication in which important responsibilities are assigned to the state courts at federal courts of
appeals.
Id.; see also Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsi-
bilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 710-15 (1984) [hereinafter Estreicher & Sexton,
Managerial]. The managerial model attempts to provide the Court with a modem endpoint for its evolu-
tion from the traditional error-correcting model. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing the
error-correcting model and distinguishing more modem concepts of the Court's appellate iole).
90. ESTREICHER & SEXTON, REDEFINING, supra note 89, at 49.
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structural signal (such as a persistent conflict between subordinates)
indicated a problem requiring correction.91
The Estreicher and Sexton managerial model is designed to provide
guidance for Supreme Court decision making in all aspects of the Court's
jurisdiction. Estreicher and Sexton propose that the Court's docket be
divided into three distinct segments: a priority docket, a discretionary
docket, and an "improvident grant" docket.'t Under this tripartite
framework, Supreme Court review of Federal Circuit patent cases would
ordinarily fall to the discretionary docket, in which the Court exercises
review "as an exercise of its supervisory authority," rather than as a
means for resolving lower court conflicts.93
Experience with Supreme Court review of Federal Circuit patent
cases to date suggests that the broad principles underlying the model -
the emphasis on management and delegation-may have significant
force.94. Specifically, a managerial or "process" model may help explain
the Court's past successes and failures in review of Federal Circuit patent
decisions, and may provide prudential guidelines for future cases.
3. Recent Supreme Court Patent Decisions: A Managerial Perspective
Obvious examples of existing cases in which the Supreme Court
may be said to have followed a managerial model include cases that, al-
though they are nominally patent cases, in fact facially present an issue of
the allocation of power among institutional actors. Most straightfor-
wardly, in Dickinson v. Zurko,95 the Court held that the Federal Circuit
erred in applying the "clearly erroneous" standard of review to PTO fact
findings rather than the less stringent APA standard.96 On its face,
Zurko bears fundamentally upon the allocation of power between the
Federal Circuit and the PTO. Supreme Court intervention to establish
the allocation of authority with some measure of finality was vital.
Similarly, in Cardinal Chemical,97 the Court dealt with a jurisdic-
tional issue arising from the Federal Circuit decision-making process:
when the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court noninfringement judg-
ment, the Federal Circuit routinely vacated any accompanying declara-
91. Id at 50.
92. See id at 44-45. The priority docket would include "cases the Court ordinarily should hear when
they arise, irrespective of the Justices' own assessment of their significance"; the discretionary docket would
include cases that, for example, "provide the Court with vehicles for major advances in the development of
federal law" but do not otherwise qualify as priority cases; and the "improvident grant" docket would in-
clude cases that lack the qualifications for the discretionary or priority dockets. Id. at 44-45.
93. Id. at 67-68.
94. I leave aside broader questions, such as whether the Estreicher and Sexton model is appro-
priate for Supreme Court review generally, and whether the formal proposal for docket division
should be accepted.
95. 527 U.S. 150(1999).
96. See id. at 165; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (allowing agency fact findings to be set aside when
they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence).
97. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
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tory judgment on patent validity.98 The Court found no justification for
the practice as a matter of the Article III "case or controversy" require-
ment, notions of jurisdictional "mootness," or as a matter of the sound
exercise of the Federal Circuit's discretion."
In Markman,"u the Court explored the scope of the Seventh
Amendment guarantee as applied to patent claim construction. Because
the Seventh Amendment historical analysis and the analysis of patent
law precedent proved inconclusive, the Court inquired into "functional
considerations...... Here, the Court arguably operated as manager, decid-
ing how to allocate the work of claim construction as between judge and
jury, and necessarily establishing power relationships between fact-
finder, district court judge, and the Federal Circuit.
Similar cases seem likely to arise in the future. For example, cases
involving other questions of administrative law, such as whether the Fed-
eral Circuit should accord Chevron deference to PTO decisions," or
procedure, such as whether the Federal Circuit should apply its own law
to antitrust matters, 1°3 may be expected to conform with a managerial
model, in which the Supreme Court intervenes as arbiter of a power
struggle among patent law institutions.
But the managerial model tells us little if it can be extended only to
"patent" cases that turn on procedural or even Constitutional issues
rather than substantive patent issues. True substantive patent cases pro-
98. E.g., Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 F.2d 1510, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
99. See Cardinal ChenL Co., 508 U.S. at 97-99. The Court did leave open the possibility that some
cases might present a different policy analysis that would favor a discretionary vacatur of a validity judg-
ment. See id at 102. Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's analysis as to Article III and jurisdictional
mootness, but dissented as to the Court's limits on the Federal Circuit's discretionary vacatur. See id at 103
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Notably, Scalia's dissent clearly evinces the rhetoric of delegation. Scalia worried
that the discretionary vacatur issue involved "the practicalities of the Federal Circuit's specialized patent
jurisdiction, rather than matters of statutory or constitutional interpretation with which we are familiar."
Id at 105 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Accordingly, it was especially important that the practice be assessed
against the backdrop of a true adversary proceeding, which was lacking because both parties sought to
overturn the Federal Circuit's practice. See id. at 103 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the discretionary
vacatur point "is much less tied to general principles of law with which I am familiar, and much more re-
lated to the peculiarities of patent litigation, with which I deal only sporadically").
100. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
101. See id at 388-91 (resting the decision on "functional considerations" such as the promotion of
uniform results and the respective competence of decision makers to carry out interpretation).
102. Scholars have already given the topic rigorous consideration. E.g., R. Carl Moy, Judicial Defer-
ence to the PTO's Interpretations of the Patent Law, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 406, 438 (1992)
(characterizing the PTO as an "atypical, non-expert agency excluded from the effects of Chevron"); Craig
A. Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Usefid Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1430-39 (1995); Arti Rai, Intellec-
tual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827,843-47
(1999).
103. See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067-68 (Fed. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 525 U.S. 876 (1998) (holding that "whether conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to
strip a patentee of its immunity from the antitrust laws is to be decided as a question of Federal Circuit
law"); see also In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that a
claim for unilateral refusal to sell patented parts would be adjudicated under Federal Circuit law, while a
claim for unilateral refusal to sell or license copyrighted manuals and software would be decided under the
law of the originating circuit).
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vide the more instructive and interesting examples. Among the Supreme
Court's substantive patent law decisions in the Federal Circuit era,
Pfaff°4 provides a reasonably good illustration of the ways in which ap-
plying the managerial model might subtly alter the tenor of Supreme
Court decisions and the impact of the Supreme Court on substantive
patent law.
Taken superficially, Pfaff appears to be standard fare. The Federal
Circuit had invalidated patent claims based on the on-sale bar 5 even
though the subject matter of the sale had not yet been reduced to prac-
tice. The Court said that it was granting certiorari to resolve a circuit
split: "[O]ther courts have held or assumed that an invention cannot be
on sale within the meaning of § 102(b) unless and until it has been re-
duced to practice... ."" Briefly surveying some of the relevant policy
considerations, the Court fashioned its own on-sale standard. 107
On its face, the Pfaff decision seems to be a singularly unsatisfying
Supreme Court foray into substantive patent law. The Court's rationale
for granting certiorari-the existence of an intercircuit conflict-is sus-
pect. The conflict seems largely contrived; after all, it is a conflict be-
tween the Federal Circuit and regional appellate tribunals no longer hav-
ing jurisdiction over the on-sale bar question.0 8 Moreover, it is doubtful
whether there was any perception among patent practitioners of the exis-
tence of any genuine conflict; rather, the Federal Circuit had expressly
considered and definitively rejected the reduction to practice standard in
UMC Electronics,'" and the UMC Electronics approach was not ques-
tioned in subsequent Federal Circuit opinions."0 Thus, the Supreme
Court was not choosing between extant competing rules. Moreover, the
104. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
105. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
106. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 60. The Court also questioned whether the statute supported the Federal Cir-
cuit's rhetoric, under which Pfaff's invention was deemed to be on-sale as long as it would "substantially
complete," even if not complete to the point of a reduction to practice. See id.
107. The Court held that:
[T]he on-sale bar applies when two conditions are satisfied before the critical date. First, the
product must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale.... Second, the invention must be
ready for patenting. That condition may be satisfied in at least two ways: by proof of reduction
to practice before the critical date; or by proof that prior to the critical date the inventor had pre-
pared drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a
person skilled in the art to practice the invention.
Id. at 67-68.
108. The Court cited precedent from the Seventh and Second Circuits imposing a reduction to prac-
tice prerequisite on applicability of the on-sale bar. See id at 60, citing Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523
F.2d 288,299-302 (2d Cir. 1975); Dart Indus., Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 489 F.2d 1359, 1365,
n.l (7th Cir. 1973), cerL denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974).
109. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 653-56 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1025 (1988).
110. This is not to suggest that the Federal Circuit's rule was free from criticism. Commentators cer-
tainly had criticized the Federal Circuit's policy-driven standard as lacking any meaningful constraints on
judicial discretion. E.g., Landry, supra note 88, at 1169. However, there appears to be no evidence that the
patent community was seriously mystified by any apparent "circuit split."
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Court's attempt to fashion its own substantive standard leaves something
to be desired."'
One might conclude that Pfaff appears to be an unfortunate venture
because it simply involves no compelling allocation issue. But one can
easily imagine other, more interesting scenarios. Consider, for example,
the Federal Circuit's heavy reliance on the "totality-of-the-
circumstances" rubric in its on-sale bar decisions."' One could argue that
if the Federal Circuit's on-sale bar standard was deficient for its uncer-
tainties, the "totality-of-the-circumstances" overlay was the culprit, not
the court's reliance on substantial completion of the invention."' Apply-
ing the managerial model, the question might then become whether, by
its use of the totality-of-the-circumstances standard, the Federal Circuit
has arrogated to itself too much of the decision-making responsibility for
the on-sale bar determination, leaving too little for the trier of fact.
This alternative rationale for certiorari might have yielded an en-
tirely different opinion emphasizing the relative competence of respec-
tive decision makers, assessing their respective capacities for best balanc-
ing the substantive policy aims underlying the on-sale bar. Most
importantly, the Supreme Court could have definitively resolved this al-
location issue without engaging in the messy work of reformulating the
substantive standard from scratch. For instance, the Court could have
demanded that the Federal Circuit discard the totality-of-the-
circumstances standard in favor of a deferential approach, leaving the
Federal Circuit to articulate the details of the substantive standard.
Played out in this manner, Pfaff would have been an entirely sensi-
ble exercise from an institutional perspective." 4 Had it conformed to a
managerial model, the Court may well have arrived at the same outcome.
But the Court could have contoured its decision very differently, retain-
ing a modicum of meaningful review authority while avoiding microman-
agement of the substantive standard.
The much anticipated Warner-Jenkinson opinionll'- another rare
instance of Supreme Court intervention into substantive patent stan-
dards-provides another opportunity to explore the applicability of a
managerial model. The Federal Circuit had upheld a jury verdict of in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The alleged infringer
111. See William C. Rooklidge & Russell B. Hill, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The On Sale
Bar After Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 163, 167 (2000) (offering vari-
ous criticisms).
112. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 65-67 (citing relevant Federal Circuit authority).
113. In fact, the Court in Pfaff made brief mention of the totality of the circumstances approach, and
the possibility of shortcomings with it. See id at 66 n.11. For other criticism of the totality of circumstances
approach as used in the context of the § 102(b) bar, see Landry, supra note 88, at 1192; William C. Rook-
lidge & Stephen C. Jensen, Common Sense, Simplicity and Experimental Use Negation of the Public Use
and On Sale Bars to Patentability, 29 J. MARSHALL L REv. 1, 29 (1995).
114. This is true independently of whether discarding the totality-of-the-circumstances test would be a
sensible solution as a matter of patent policy.
115. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton-Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
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raised a variety of challenges, including challenges to the very existence
of the doctrine, the proper test for the doctrine, whether the doctrine was
properly before the jury, and whether resort to the doctrine should have
been precluded as a matter of law under the doctrine of prosecution his-
tory estoppel. Ostensibly, the Court took the case on certiorari to re-
solve whether the Seventh Amendment guaranteed a jury trial on the
doctrine of equivalents. Instead, the Court delivered a broad-ranging
opinion in which it "endeavor[ed] to clarify the proper scope of the doc-
trine" of equivalents, 16 and instead found itself formulating new stan-
dards for prosecution history estoppel while avoiding altogether any de-
finitive resolution of the jury trial issue."7
Warner-Jenkinson contains a mixture of statements, at least some of
which are consistent with a managerial model. For example, the Court
wisely ducked the debate over the proper "linguistic framework" for doc-
trine of equivalents analysis. Instead, the Court satisfied itself with a
brief recitation of limiting principles, and then announced its intention to
defer:
With these limiting principles as a backdrop, we see no purpose in
going further and micro-managing the Federal Circuit's particular
word-choice for analyzing equivalence. We expect that the Federal
Circuit will refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in the
orderly course of case-by-case determinations, and we leave such
refinement to that court's sound judgment in this area of its special
expertise.18
This is clearly a reflection of the impulse to delegate, consistent with the
broad outlines of the managerial model. While it leaves substantial work
to the Federal Circuit, that is as it should be; the Federal Circuit should
be able to deploy its expertise to manage more efficiently the linguistic
framework for the doctrine of equivalents.
Similarly, in the course of avoiding any definitive ruling on the issue
of a Seventh Amendment jury trial right on infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents, the Court effectively invoked procedural mecha-
nisms to guide future allocations of decision-making responsibility on
substantive patent matters. Offering "only guidance, not a specific man-
date,""' 9 the Court encouraged the Federal Circuit to address possible
lower court reluctance to grant summary judgments on equivalency is-
sues and called for the use of special verdict forms calling out specific
116. Idat2l.
117. According to the Court:
The Federal Circuit held that it was for the jury to decide whether the accused process was
equivalent to the claimed process. There was ample support in our prior cases for that hold-
ing.... Whether, if the issue were squarely presented to us, we would reach a different conclu-
sion than did the Federal Circuit is not a question we need decide today.
Id at 38-39.
118. Id at40.
119. Id at 39 n.8.
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claim elements to facilitate review of jury verdicts on equivalency. 120
Even as to these procedural matters, the Court carefully refrained from
interjecting itself into details of the debate: "We leave it to the Federal
Circuit how best to implement procedural improvements to promote cer-
tainty, consistency, and reviewability to this area of the law.'
121
Unfortunately, Warner-Jenkinson is not an unalloyed embodiment
of adherence to the managerial model. In some respects, the Court's
reasoning is clearly inconsistent with the model and, tellingly, these are
the least successful aspects of the opinion. The Court's commentary on
prosecution history estoppel provides an illustration. The Court asserted
that in view of the notice function of claims, a patent applicant's silence
during prosecution as to the reasons for a claim amendment should be
held against the applicant presumptively. The patentee could later over-
come the presumption by showing that the patentee made the amend-
ment for reasons other than limiting claim scope. According to the
Court:
Where no explanation is established, however, the court should
presume that the PTO had a substantial reason related to pat-
entability for including the limiting element added by amendment.
In those circumstances, prosecution history estoppel would bar the
application of the doctrine of equivalents to that element. 22
It is clear, especially in hindsight, that in this foray into substantive
prosecution history estoppel standard-setting, the Court was entering un-
reasonably rough waters, and, worse, seemed to be doing so unwit-
tingly."2 Whatever its genesis, the Court's inartful phrasing here has be-
deviled subsequent litigants, launched a debate between Federal Circuit
judges marked by unusual divisiveness and intemperate rhetoric,'24 and
120. See id
121. Id
122. Id at 33.
123. In particular, the Court appears to have been unaware that a body of case law had already devel-
oped around the question of the proper scope of estoppel under the prosecution history estoppel doctrine.
That case law generally supported the proposition that prosecution history estoppel precluded an assertion
of equivalency so broad in scope as to operate as an effort to recapture what the applicant gave up. Nar-
rower assertions of equivalency were still allowed. E.g., Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1555-56 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); Dixie USA, Inc. v. In-
fab Corp., 927 F.2d 584, 588 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("A total preclusion of equivalence should not apply."); La-
Bounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 867 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (prosecution
history estoppel is not necessarily "fatal to application of the doctrine itself"); Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (the scope of estoppel can be anywhere "from great to
small to zero"). By ruling that prosecution history estoppel would "bar the application of the doctrine of
equivalents as to that element," the Court seemed to be imposing a contrary rule that precluded even nar-
rower assertions of equivalency. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33.
124. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1456-58 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In view of prior
case law, including Supreme Court decisions recognizing the concept of scope of prosecution history estop-
pel, it was improper to construe the Court's Warner-Jenkinson statement as endeavoring to "change so sub-
stantially the rules of the game." In addition, the Court stated that "[a] careful reading of the Supreme
Court's opinion in context shows that Warner-Jenkinson did not effect a change in the scope of subject mat-
ter precluded by an estoppel, but only in the circumstances that may trigger an estoppel." Id. But cf
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1384, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (denial of suggestion for rehear-
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spawned an en banc review of the prosecution history estoppel doctrine
in a case that may well itself wind up back at the door of the Supreme
Court.125
Perhaps the Court's oversight here is a mere isolated instance of
carelessness. On the other hand, perhaps it exemplifies a potential sys-
temic problem. The potential for gaffes of this sort is especially acute
where the Court sits as overseer of an expert tribunal in a complex area
of law, and this potential grows as the scope and strength of the auton-
omy of the expert tribunal expands. The Court should have more care-
fully considered the reasons for taking Warner-Jenkinson on certiorari in
the first place. Had it done so, the Court might have directed the Federal
Circuit to fashion the appropriate substantive standard for prosecution
history estoppel.
The Eli Lilly case 26 furnishes even a less satisfying illustration of the
Supreme Court's involvement in substantive patent law decision making.
Eli Lilly involved a dispute over the scope of the infringement exemption
of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), 127 which exempts acts undertaken in connection
with "the development and submission of information under a Federal
law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs. '" "8 The al-
leged infringer, Medtronic, produced an implantable cardiac defibrilla-
tor, a medical device subject to an FDA pre-market approval procedure
under § 515 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).29
The issue, as the Court recognized, was purely one of statutory interpre-
tation:
The core of the present controversy is that petitioner [Lilly] inter-
prets the statutory phrase, "a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs," to refer only to those individual
ing en banc) (Clevenger and Gajarsa, JJ., dissenting); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 145 F.3d 1472,
1472 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (denial of suggestion for rehearing en banc) (Plager, Clevenger, and Gajarsa, JJ., dis-
senting).
125. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 172 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999), va-
cated and reh'g en banc granted, 187 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999). En banc questions three and four are most
relevant to the Warner-Jenkinson statement:
(3) If a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel, under Warner-Jenkinson what
range of equivalents, if any, is available under the doctrine of equivalents for the claim element so
amended?
(4) When "no explanation [for a claim amendment] is established," Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at
33, thus invoking the presumption of prosecution history estoppel under Warner-Jenkinson, what
range of equivalents, if any, is available under the doctrine of equivalents for the claim element so
amended?
Festo, 187 F.3d at 1381-82.
126. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
127. According to that provision:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or
import into the United States a patented invention.., solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufac-
ture, use, or sale of drugs ....
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1994).
128. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665.
129. See 21 U.S.C. § 360(e) (Supp. III 1997).
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provisions of federal law that regulate drugs, whereas respondent
[Medtronic] interprets it to refer to the entirety of any Act (includ-
ing, of course, the FDCA) at least some of whose provisions regu-
late drugs.13°
Adopting Medtronic's interpretation, the Court majority affirmed, clos-
ing with a curmudgeonly flourish:
No interpretation we have been able to imagine can transform §
271(e)(1) into an elegant piece of statutory draftsmanship. To con-
strue it as the Court of Appeals decided, one must posit a good deal
of legislative imprecision; but to construe it as petitioner would, one
must posit that and an implausible substantive intent as well. 3 '
The prudential limitations of a managerial model would have counseled
strongly against a certiorari grant in Lilly. An exercise in interpreting
the language of a complex provision of the Patent Statute does not pre-
sent any straightforward allocation issue and, under ordinary circum-
stances, would seem precisely the sort of task suited to the Federal Cir-
cuit, which should be able most efficiently to deploy its expertise in
rendering an interpretation that coheres with other complementary
statutory provisions and patent policy more generally. 13 2
Of course, the Federal Circuit might get it wrong, and the manage-
rial model would still counsel against Supreme Court intervention. But
that is just the point: under a managerial model, Court participation is
triggered by the presence of a compelling allocation issue, not by the
presence of substantive error. The managerial model suggests that the
Court may be better-off overall if it lets stand some substantive error, in
order to achieve the benefits of conserving judicial resources and apply-
ing them to higher priority problems (quite possibly outside of patent law
altogether).
It is also worth observing that a managerial model is likely to be
fluid enough to allow Supreme Court intervention even in a case like
Lilly. The Court could, for example, find fault with the methodology of
interpretation employed by the Federal Circuit, and justify intervention
as an exercise of its superior authority to dictate the interpretive process.
While such an argument seems consistent with the principles underlying
the managerial model-barely-it offers a strikingly thin pretext for in-
tervention, and would undermine the model if used in any but the most
extraordinary case.
130. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665-66.
131. Id at 679.
132. The same conclusion would be reached under application of Estreicher and Sexton's managerial
model: "Rulings framed as interpretations of a statute ... do not present the kind of confrontation with a
coordinate branch that requires immediate intervention by the Court." ESTREICHER & SEXTON,
REDEFINING, supra note 89, at 61 (urging that such disputes be relegated to the Court's "discretionary"
docket, meaning that the Court would choose to take them up only after exhausting all cases on its "prior-
ity" docket).
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4. Future Supreme Court Patent Jurisprudence Under a Managerial
Model
Turning finally to an exploration of how a managerial model might
be applied in disputes that are likely to generate certiorari petitions in
the near future, it appears that a managerial model could offer useful
guidance for future Supreme Court patent jurisprudence. Consider first
a hypothetical case that features claims to an Internet-implemented busi-
ness model. Assume that the claims have been held by the Federal Cir-
cuit to constitute patent-eligible subject matter under the standard of
State Street Bank and its progeny. 3 3 Consider a second case featuring
claims to a target gene corresponding to an expressed sequence tag
(EST). Assume that the Federal Circuit holds that these claims satisfy
the statutory utility requirement 1" under the standard of In re Brana.13'
Some observers would presumably point to cases such as these as
the very epitome of Federal Circuit hubris, presenting a compelling case
for Supreme Court review under what is seemingly a very mundane ra-
tionale: alleged substantive error on the part of the Federal Circuit, with
arguably dramatic economic consequences. Considered more carefully,
however, this rationale for intervention leans towards a vision of the Su-
preme Court as an error-correcting institution, which is no longer a vi-
able conception of the Court's function. Moreover, assuming that one
rejects an interventionist approach, then merely identifying an alleged
substantive error may not alone be sufficient to trigger Supreme Court
review.
What result would be obtained under proper deployment of a
managerial model? Would adherence to a managerial model shield the
Federal Circuit from review in the two hypothetical cases? This is clearly
an important question, because it exposes what is presumably the pri-
mary objection to a managerial model: that it envisions such a highly at-
tenuated role for the Court in future patent cases that it is practically in-
distinguishable from the current practice of invisibility.
. In fact, though, it would be quite easy to justify Supreme Court in-
tervention in both of the hypothetical cases under a managerial model.
Both cases involve a clear allocation issue -indeed, the same allocative
issue: the power relationship between the Supreme Court and the Fed-
eral Circuit as manifested in Federal Circuit obedience to pre-Federal
Circuit era Supreme Court precedent, Gottschalk v. Benson'31 in the
133. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). Justice Stevens, at least, may have already hinted that the matter of statutory
subject matter for software claims has his attention. See Excel Communications, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 172
F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999) (Stevens, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari)
("The importance of the question presented in this certiorari petition makes it appropriate to reiterate the
fact that the denial of the petition does not constitute a ruling on the merits.").
134. See35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
135. 51 F.3d 1560,1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
136. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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software hypothetical and Brenner v. Manson'37 in the utility hypotheti-
cal. 138
If application of the managerial model, and pursuit of an ad hoc ap-
proach to certiorari grant, would both lead to certiorari grants in the hy-
pothetical cases, then what does the managerial model really add? First,
the model could help refine the certiorari inquiry in patent cases. The
model calls primarily for judgments not only about which issues can be
reformulated as issues of allocation, but also about which issues, once
formulated, present a compelling case for review. Distinguishing the
compelling from the mundane may itself call for some expertise, but the
cost, in terms of institutional resources, may be modest. 39
This function is to be distinguished carefully from the function of
dictating the frequency of certiorari grants. One might suppose that the
Supreme Court would continue to be highly selective in granting certio-
rari in patent cases under a managerial model, but this outcome is by no
means inevitable. It may turn out to be relatively easy for the Supreme
Court to recast many substantive patent law disputes as matters of the
allocation of power. 4°
Second, even if the managerial model may have relatively little to
say about the frequency of certiorari grants in patent cases, it should
have a good deal to say about the way in which Supreme Court patent
decisions are constructed. Consider again the hypothetical involving sub-
ject matter eligibility for computer software. If the Court grants certio-
rari on the rationale offered above-the need to relieve possible tension
between Supreme Court precedent and current Federal Circuit practice
as to subject matter eligibility for software patents-then there is no
need for the Court to take on the task of formulating its own standard for
software patent, subject matter eligibility. Instead, the Court could, for
example, summarily endorse Federal Circuit practice. A summary en-
dorsement would serve a useful purpose, clearing away nagging ques-
tions about the continuing effect of Gottschalk, confirming the Court's
continued relevance as an overseer, yet avoiding the need for the Court
to spend scarce resources on substantive detail, critical though that detail
may be. The same advantages would be achieved if the Court were to
reject summarily the Federal Circuit practice and direct the Federal Cir-
137. 383 U.S. 519(1966).
138. A similar analysis might be applied to the doctrine of licensee estoppel, where Federal Circuit
practice arguably diverges from Supreme Court precedent established in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653
(1969). For a persuasive critique of Lear, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Es-
toppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REv. 677 (1986).
139. For example, one should not overlook the potential role of the Solicitor General's office in flag-
ging cases where allocation of decision making responsibility is really the issue. Personal communication
from Professor John Duffy, Apr. 2000.
140. Indeed, the Supreme Court could presumably justify a certiorari grant in any case on these terms,
on the rationale that the fact of Supreme Court intervention is itself inherently a statement about the Su-
preme Court's own exercise of power as an institutional player in the patent system. Frequent use of this
rationale would obviously tend towards interventionism and the problems associated with that approach.
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cuit to formulate standards that are consistent with Gottschalk. In either
instance, the Court would be engaged in quintessential executive deci-
sion making, a role for which it is well-suited.
All of this may suggest that adoption of the managerial model may
leave the Supreme Court a bit tongue-tied as to substantive patent mat-
ters. This, in fact, is a good thing. Or, to put a finer point on it, the
model seeks to supply prudential limitations for the Court, reminding the
Court that in the ordinary case it can minimize the potential for enmesh-
ing itself in the minutiae of substantive doctrine by disciplining itself to
speak in allocative terms. Viewed generously, this is the best of both
worlds; less generously, it is a workable compromise. The Court retains
its power to influence the direction of the substantive law, but does so
indirectly, remaining safely removed from the front lines of the doctrinal
fray by resisting the temptation to speak directly on substantive doctrinal
matters.
In conclusion, the Court should adopt a managerial model for re-
view of the Federal Circuit's substantive patent decisions. Alternatively,
the Court must adopt some model that maintains its visibility in patent
law while avoiding micromanagement. The Court should view this task
not only as an important one within the sphere of patent law, but also as
a key question on the absorption of a limited subject matter appellate
tribunal into the structure of the federal judiciary.
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